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ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW
VoL VII MAY, 1933 No. 2
VALUE AND THE DOCTRINE OF BONA FIDE
PURCHASE
F ROM time to time statutes have been enacted in New
York State for the protection of the bona fide purchaser.'
In all of them except the Debtor and Creditor Law relating
to fraudulent conveyances and the Lien Law relating to the
filing of chattel mortgages, it is required that he have given
"value" or "valuable consideration." 2 But with the excep-
2DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW §278 (Laws of 1925, c. 254) ; GENERAL BUSI-
NESS LAW §§94, 132, 133 (Laws of 1907, c. 732) ; LIEN LAW §§230, 235 (Laws
of 1916, c. 348, Laws of 1915, c. 608) ; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, §§35,
50, 52, 54, 55, 79, 91, 93 (Laws of 1897); PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW §§32, 40
(Laws of 1897), §§101 (4), 105, 106, 119, 143 (Laws of 1911, c. 571), §§168,
169 (Laws of 1913, c. 600), §§192, 193, 200, 201 (b), 209, 224, 225, 226 (d),
228, 229 (Laws of 1911, c. 248); REAL PROPERTY LAW §§95, 245, 266, 291
(Laws of 1896) ; STOCK CORPORATION LAW §17 (Laws of 1901, c. 354).
2 GENERAL BUSINESS LAW §94 (making warehouseman issuing non-nego-!
tiable receipt not plainly marked "non-negotiable" liable to "a holder" of the
receipt who purchased it for value supposing it to be negotiable), §132 (declar-
ing that subsequent negotiation of a negotiable warehouse receipt by a seller
left in possession of the same "to any person receiving the same in good faith,for value and without notice of the previous sale" of the goods covered by the
receipt "shall have the same effect as if the first purchaser of the goods or
receipt had expressly authorized the subsequent negotiation"), §133 ("where a
negotiable receipt has been issued for goods, no seller's lien or right of stoppage
in transitu shall defeat the rights of any purchaser for value in good faith to
Whom such receipt has been negotiated, etc.").
PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW §32 (requiring transfers and mortgages of inter-
ests in decedents' estates to be in writing and recorded in order to be valid
against "any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same interest, or any
part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable consideration, whose conveyance
or mortgage is first duly recorded"), §40 (declaring that the fact a transfer of
personal property was made with intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors
shall not impair the title of a purchaser for a valuable consideration unless it
appear that such purchaser had previous notice, etc.), §67 (declaring that a
conditional sale of fixtures is void after they are affixed "as against subsequent
purchasers of the realty for value and without notice of the conditional seller's
title, unless the conditional sale contract" shall be filed before such purchase,
etc.), §101 (4) (declaring that where seller sends bill of lading with draft
attached, directly to buyer "one who purchases in good faith, for value, the bill
of lading or goods from the buyer will obtain the property in the goods,
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tion of the statutes relating to negotiable instruments, the
transfer of negotiable warehouse receipts and the transfer
although the bill of exchange has not been honored, etc."), §105 ("where the
seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his title has not been avoided at
the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided he
buys them in good faith, for value, and without notice of the seller's defect of
title"), §106 (declaring that where a seller continues in possession of goods
already sold, the delivery of the same by him "to any person paying value for
the same in good faith and without notice of the previous sale, shall have the
same effect as if the person making the delivery * * * were expressly authorized
by the owner of the goods to make the same"), §119 (declaring that the nego-
tiation of a negotiable document of title is not impaired by fraud, mistake,
breach of duty or duress, "if the person to whom the document was negotiated
* * * paid value therefor, without notice of the breach of duty, or fraud, mis-
take or duress"), §143 (declaring that if "a negotiable document of title has
been issued for goods, no seller's lien or right of stoppage in transitu shall
defeat the right of any purchaser for value in good faith to whom such docu-
ment has been negotiated, etc."), §168 (declaring that a transfer of a stock
certificate may be rescinded for certain enumerated reasons, "unless the certifi-
cate has been transferred to a purchaser for value in good faith without notice
of any facts making the wrongful, etc."), §169 (declaring that such rescission
will not invalidate a subsequent transfer of the certificate "to a purchaser for
value in good faith, without notice of any facts making the transfer wrongful,
etc."), §192 (forbidding the issuance of bills of lading in sets, and declaring
that "if so issued the carrier issuing them shall be liable for failure to deliver
the goods described therein to any one who purchases a part for value in good
faith, etc."), §193 (declaring that when more than one negotiable bill is issued
for the same goods, a carrier failing to mark "duplicate" on those not intended
as the original, shall be liable for damages caused thereby "to any one who has
purchased the bill for value in good faith as an original, etc."), §200 (providing
that if a carrier fails to take up and cancel a negotiable bill when delivering
the goods, it shall be liable "to any one who for value and in good faith" sub-
sequently purchases the bill), §201 (b) (declaring that if a carrier delivers part
of the goods without noting such fact on the negotiable bill of lading, it shall
be liable for failure to deliver all the goods specified in the bill "to any one
who for value and in good faith" subsequently purchases it, etc.), §209 (declar-
ing that the carrier shall be liable for non-receipt or misdescription of goods to
anyone "who has given value in good faith relying on the receipt or description
of the goods in the bill, etc."), §224 (declaring that the negotiation of a nego-
tiable bill of lading is not impaired by fraud, mistake, breach of duty, or duress
"if the person to whom the bill was negotiated * * * gave value therefor, in good
faith, without notice of the breach of duty, or fraud, etc."), §225 (declaring
that where a seller of goods in carrier's possession or of a negotiable bill of
lading covering them "continues in possession of the negotiable bill, the subse-
quent negotiation thereof by that person-to any person receiving the same
in good faith, for value and without notice of the previous sale, shall have the
same effect as if the first purchaser of the goods or bill had expressly author-
ized the subsequent negotiation"), §226 (d) (same as §101 [4] supra), §228
(declaring that where a negotiable bill has been issued for goods, no seller's
lien or right of stoppage in transitu shall defeat the rights of any purchaser
for value in good faith to whom such bill has been negotiated, etc.).
REAL PROPERTY LAW §95 ("an implied or resulting trust shall not be alleged
or established, to defeat or prejudice the title of a purchaser for a valuable
consideration without notice of the trust"), §245 ("a greater estate or interest
does not pass by any grant or conveyance, than the grantor possessed or could
lawfully convey, at the time of the delivery of the deed; except that every grant
is conclusive against the grantor and his heirs claiming from him by descent
and as against a subsequent purchaser or incumbrancer from such grantor, or
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of corporate stock,3 none of them, not even the Recording
Acts, define "value" or "valuable consideration." Indeed
from such heirs claiming as such, other than a subsequent purchaser or incum-
brancer in good faith and for a valuable consideration, who acquires a superior
title by a conveyance that has been first duly recorded,"), §266 (declaring that
the provisions of Article 10 of the Real Property Law do "not in any manner
affect or impair the title of a purchaser or incumbrancer for a valuable con-
sideration, unless it appears that he had previous notice of the fraudulent intent
of his immediate grantor, or of the fraud rendering void the title of such
grantor"), §291 (providing for the recording of conveyances and declaring that
"every such conveyance not so recorded is void as against any subsequent pur-
chaser in good faith and for a valuable coiideration, from the same vendor,
his heirs or devisees, of the same real property * * * whose conveyance is first Z
duly recorded").
STocK CoPoATIoN LAW §17 (providing that whenever the officers of any
corporation shall have made and filed and recorded a certificate that the execu-
tion of the mortgage has been duly consented to by stockholders, "such certifi-
cate shall be conclusive evidence as to the truth thereof, in favor of any and
all persons who in good faith shall receive or purchase for vahw, any obliga-
tion purporting to be secured by such mortgage").
But the DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW instead of employing the term "value"
or "valuable consideration" uses the term "fair consideration." §273 declares
that "every conveyance made * * * by a person who is or Will be
thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his
actual intent if the conveyance is made * * * without 'fair consideration.'"
§274 declares that every conveyance made without fair consideration when the
person making it is engaged in a business for which the property remaining
in his hands after the conveyance, is unreasonably small capital, is fraudulent
to the creditors, etc. §278 declares that "where a conveyance * * * is
fraudulent as to a creditor, such creditor, when his claim has matured, may, as
against any person except a purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge
of the fraud at the time of the purchase * * * have the conveyance set aside,
etc." The term fair consideration is defined in §272 of the DEBTOR AND CREDI-
TOR LAW as follows: "Fair consideration is given for property, or obligation.
(a) When in exchange for such property, or obligation, as a fair equivalent
therefor, and in good faith, property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satis-
fied, or, (b) when such property, or obligation is received in good faith to secure
a present advance or antecedent debt in amount not disproportionately small as
compared with the value of the property, or obligation obtained."
LIEr LAW §§230 and 235, providing for the filing and refiling of chattel
mortgages, declares that unless the mortgage is accompanied by immediate
delivery of the thing mortgaged, it is absolutely void as against subsequent
purchasers and mortgagees in good faith, unless the mortgage is filed. Nothing
is said about value or valuable consideration but merely good faith. The LIEN
LAW does not define the term "good faith."
'GENERAL BUSINESS LAW §142, relating to transfers of negotiable ware-
house receipts, defines value as "any consideration sufficient to support a simple
contract. An antecedent or pre-existing obligation, whether for money or not,
constitutes value where a receipt is taken either in satisfaction thereof, or as
security therefor."
PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW §183, relating to transfers of corporate stock,
defines "value" as "any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.
An antecedent or pre-existing obligation, whether for money or not, constitutes
value where a certificate is taken either in satisfaction thereof, or as security
therefor"
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §51 defines value as "any consideration
sufficient to support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt
constitutes value; and is deemed such whether the instrument is payable on
demand or at a future time."
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in adopting two Uniform Acts, drafted by the Commission-
ers of Uniform State Laws, our legislature "expressly"
omitted therefrom the definitions of value.4  The result is,
that under all the Recording Acts and other statutes of this
state designed for the protection of the bona fide-purchaser
both in respect to real property and personal property, the
common law conception of "value" still governs with the
exception of those relating to negotiable instruments, ware-
house receipts, corporate stock, and conveyances fraudulent
as to creditors under the debtor and creditor law.
It is the purpose of this article to review the common
law decisions of this state on the subject of "value" as ap-
plied to the doctrine of bona fide purchase. But before
doing so, a few words as to the origin and early development
of the doctrine may serve to explain and clarify such
decisions.
The problem does not seem to have vexed the early com-
mon law. It rarely, if ever, had to decide between the real
owner and the innocent purchaser for value either of real
or personal property. Both the law and feudal society
frowned on trading in land, and when alienation became
possible, it was so set about with formalities, such as livery
of seisin, etc., that it was almost impossible for one who
did not have the title to make a conveyance of land. In
respect to transfers of personal property the cardinal rule
of caveat emptor applied in all cases, except to purchases
in market overt.
It was the fixed policy of the common law to protect
one in the ownership of his property. As late as 1838 we
find it laid down as "the universal and fundamental prin-
ciple of our law of personal property that no man can be
' Section 76 of the Uniform Sales Act defines value as "any consideration
sufficient to support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing claim,
whether for money or not, constitutes value where goods or documents of title
are taken either in satisfaction thereof or as security therefor." But this defini-
tion was omitted by the New York legislature when it adopted the Sales Act
(PERs. PROP. LAW §§82-158).
Section 53 of the Uniform Bills of Lading Act defines value as "any con-
sideration sufficient to support a single contract. An antecedent or pre-existing
obligation, whether for money or not, constitutes value where a bill is taken
either in satisfaction thereof or as security therefor." But this definition was
omitted by the New York legislature when it adopted the Uniform Bills of
Lading Act (PERS. PROP. LAW §§187-247).
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divested of his property without his own consent; and, con-
sequently, that even the honest purchaser under a defective
title cannot hold against the true proprietor." 5 And even
as late as 1878 our Court of Appeals said: "The purchaser
buys at his risk of the title, and, if he would be safe, must
make inquiry. He may not with certainty stop at the fact
of possession, but must learn how the possession has been
acquired." 6
In accordance with this general rule it is held that a
bona fide purchaser for value from a thief cannot keep the
goods as against the owner.7 And that one who buys goods
for value and without notice from one who acquired posses-
sion of them by fraud but without any intention on the part
of the owner to transfer title to him cannot keep them as
against the owner.8 So also, one having possession of per-
sonal property as a bailee can give no title to a purchaser,
although the latter acts in good faith and parts with value
and is without notice of the want of title in his seller.9 As
a further instance of the disposition of the common law to
protect ownership even against a bona fide purchaser,
neither a conditional sale contract nor a chattel mortgage
had to be filed or recorded in order to preserve the interest
of the conditional vendor or chattel mortgagee as against
an innocent purchaser for value.10
The doctrine of bonta fide purchase seems to have de-
veloped from two sources: from the law merchant and from
equity. The earliest known application of the doctrine to
personal property seems to have been in reference to a pur-
chase in market overt.-' Under the law merchant a pur-
Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend. 267 (N. Y. 1838).
'Farmers, etc. Bank v. Logan, 74 N. Y. 568 (1878), per Folger, J., "A
purchaser of chattels takes them, as a general rule, subject to whatever may
turn out to be infirmities in the title." Barnard v. Campbell, 55 N. Y. 456
(1874), per Allen, $., "The general rule is that a purchaser of property takes
only such title as his seller has, and is authorized to transfer; that he acquires
precisely the interest which the seller owns, and no other or greater."
7Bassett v. Spofford, 45 N. Y. 387 (1871); Newton v. Porter, 69 N. Y.
133 (1877).
8 Soltau v. Gerdau, 119 N. Y. 380, 23 N. E. 864 (1890); Schmidt v. Simp-
son, 204 N. Y. 434, 97 N. E. 966 (1912).
'Smith v. Clews, 114 N. Y. 190, 21 N. E. 160 (1889); Green v. Wachs,
254 N. Y. 437, 173 N. E. 575 (1930).
" Goetschius v. Brightman, 245 N. Y. 186, 156 N. E. 660 (1927).
"Case of Market Overt, 5 Co. 83b (1595).
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chaser in market overt was protected though his seller had
no title whatsoever. This principle of the common law is
carried into section twenty-two of the English Sales of
Goods Act. But in this country the exception in favor of
sales in market overt has never been recognized.1
2
Another exception was made in the case of a bona fide
purchaser for value of money, bank-bills, and negotiable
paper payable to bearer or transferable by delivery in the
ordinary course of business. This, like the first exception,
was made as a concession to trade and commerce in that it
tended to sustain the credit and circulation of the cur-
rency.13 Both exceptions marked an invasion of the common
law by the law merchant.
Still another exception, known to the common law in
the case of a bona fide purchaser, is that where the owner
has conferred indicia of title upon another or clothed him
with apparent authority to sell, he will be estopped to assert
his ownership in the goods as against an innocent purchaser
for value.14  This exception being based upon estoppel had
its origin in equity.15 The real owner is precluded from
2 Wheelwright v. De Peyster, 1 Johns. 471 (N. Y. 1806); Mowrey v.
Walsh, 8 Cow. 238 (N. Y. 1828).
1 Anon., [1795] 1 Salk. 126; Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452 (1758) ; Knox v.
Eden Musee etc. Co., 148 N. Y. 441, 42 N. E. 988 (1896).
" This exception is recognized and stated in Saltus v. Everett, supra note
5, and Barnard v. Campbell, supra note 6.
" "The protection given to the bona fide purchaser had its origin exclusively
in equity, and is based upon the conception that a court of chancery acts solely
upon the conscience of litigant parties, by compelling the defendant to do what,
and only what, in foro conscientiae, he is bound to do. The protection given to
the bona fide purchaser simply means, therefore, that from the relations sub-
sisting between the two parties, -especially that which is involved in the innocent
position of the purchaser, equity refuses to interfere and to aid the plaintiff in
what he is seeking to obtain because it would be unconscientious and inequitable
to do so." 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) §738.
"When the original legal owner has done or omitted something by which it
was made possible that his property should come into the hands of a bona fide
holder by an apparently valid title, it may be just to regard him as estopped
from asserting his ownership, and thus to protect the subsequent purchaser.
But when the lrior legal owner is wholly innocent, has done and omitted
nothing, it certainly transcends, even if it does not violate, the principles of
equity, to sustain the claims of a subsequent and even bona fide purchaser."
2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) §735.
WALSH, ON EQUITY (1930) 86: "That doctrine [of bona fide purchase]
was created by equity as a limitation upon equitable ownership in the latter part
of the fifteenth century, in connection with and as part of the process of creat-
ing uses as estates in land. Having made the legal title of the trustee an empty
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disputing, as against the bona fide purchaser, the existence
of the title or power which through negligence or -mistaken
confidence he caused or allowed to appear to be vested in
the person making the transfer. This exception extended
to and covered the case where a purchaser of goods allowed
them to remain in the possession of the seller who subse-
quently sold and delivered them to an innocent purchaser
for value. It seems to have been based upon the equitable
maxim that where one of two innocent persons must suffer
loss by reason of the fraud or deceit of another, the loss
should fall on him by whose act or omission the wrong-
doer has been enabled to commit the fraud.
The various Recording Acts have largely extended the
application of the doctrine of bona fide purchase. It is,
however, interesting to learn that the earliest English Re-
cording Act made the prior unrecorded deed wholly void as
against the subsequent grantee, without reference to the
question of notice, or the payment of value. But the Court
of Chancery sought to relieve the earlier grantee from the
hardship which the enforcement of the letter of the law
might inflict, and, while respecting the command of the
statute, which made his deed void at law, it invested him
with an equitable title, which it declared should prevail
over the legal title of the subsequent purchaser if it ap-
peared that he had notice of its existence, or did not part
with value at the time of the purchase.' 6 This rule of judi-
cial construction was incorporated into the subsequent
Recording Acts in almost the identical words in which it
had been phrased by courts of equity.
Common Law Conception of Value Stated Generally.
Pomeroy says that as used in the doctrine of bona fide pur-
chase the term "valuable consideration" has no relation to
the general law of contracts and binding promises.17 Pro-
fessor Vold of the University of Nebraska Law School has
well said: "'Value' within the meaning of the rule pro-
thing of mere form so far as beneficial ownership was involved in order that
the purposes of uses could be accomplished, it seemed wise and just, from the
standpoint of the public interest, that a purchaser for value from the trustee,
without-notice of the trust, should be protected against the equitable owner."
" Per Maynard, J., in Ten Eyck v. Witbeck, 135 N. Y. 40, 48, 31 N. E.
994 (1892).
12 POMtEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE. (4th ed.) §746.
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tecting purchasers for value without notice is not at all
points the same as the value which will constitute sufficient
consideration to support a contract. A promise to pay con-
stitutes sufficient consideration to support a counter-
promise, thereby making a binding contract. Within the
meaning of the rule here discussed, however, not value prom-
ised, but value actually rendered is required." (Italics
mine.) 18 At common law valuable consideration means
and necessarily requires something of actual value, capable
of pecuniary measurement-parting with money, or money's
worth, or by surrendering, cancelling or extinguishing some
existing legal right in such a way as to leave him in a worse
position than he was in before if the property is taken from
him.19 In general, it is requisite that the money be paid
or advanced, the property transferred or the right sur-
rendered, at the time of the conveyance, and as a.part of
the transaction, in order that it may be the valuable con-
sideration which can protect the purchaser.2 0
A Donee is Not a Taker for Value. No person who has
acquired the property as a mere volunteer, whether by gift,
devise or inheritance, can be a bona fide purchaser.2'
An Assignee for Benefit of Creditors is Not a Bona
Fide Purchaser. An assignee for the benefit of creditors
merely succeeds to the rights of his assignors and is not
entitled to the protection afforded a bona fide purchaser for
value.2 2  Judge Denio gives the reason for this as follows:
"When the act respecting the filing of chattel mortgages
was passed, the term bona fide purchaser had acquired a
settled meaning, which did not include a person whose pur-
chase was on account of an existing debt, and who parted
' VoLD, ON SALES (1931) 381.
"gWebster v. Van Steenbergh, 46 Barb. 211 (N. Y. 1864); Pickett v.
Barron, 29 Barb. 505 (N. Y. 1859); Dickerson v. Tillinghast, 4 Paige 215
(N. Y. 1833); Penfield v. Dunbar, 64 Barb. 239 (N. Y. 1864); Weaver v.
Barden, 49 N. Y. 286 (1872).2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed.) §747.
1 Frost v. Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch. 288 (N. Y. 1814) ; Ten Eyck v. Witbeck,
supra note 16; Baker v. Lever, 67 N. Y. 304 (1876), holding that one to whom
a bond and mortgage, given to secure the price of property upon a fraudulent
sale, is assigned without any pecuniary consideration being paid, but simply as
a gift, does not occupy the position of a bona fide purchaser.
'Slade v. Van Vechten, 11 Paige 21 (N. Y. 1884) ; Griffen v. Marquardt,
17 N. Y. 28 (1858) ; J. P. Kane Co. v. Kinney, 174 N. Y. 69, 74, 66 N. E. 619
(1903) ; Paddell v. Janes, 84 Misc. 212, 145 N. Y. Supp. 868 (1914).
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with no property or right to obtain his conveyance. The
case of a conveyance of a debtor's property to trustees, to
enable him to make preferences among his creditors, does
not stand on a better footing than a transfer to a single
creditor as security for his debt. From the nature of the
case, the creditors part with nothing. They are not neces-
sarily or usually consulted. They take precisely what the
conveyance gives them, and they part with no existing rights.
The property is subject to the same equities, in the hands
of the trustees, which existed against it immediately before
the execution of the assignment." 23 The assignee takes no
property in the ordinary sense under the assignment but
is merely the representative of the assignor in the payment
of his debts.
A Trustee in Bankruptcy is Not a Bona Fide Purchaser.
Under both the earlier and the late federal bankruptcy stat-
utes, the trustee in bankruptcy is not entitled to the protec-
tion afforded bona fide purchasers for value.2 4  He cannot
in any case take property that is not the property of the
bankrupt.
A Judgment-Creditor Buying at the Judgment Execu-
tion Sale does not become a bona fide purchaser of goods
fraudulently purchased by his judgment-debtor where the
judgment debt is merely credited with the purchase price.
Such proceeding gives him no better title than a mere de-
livery would from the fraudulent vendee in payment of an
antecedent debt.25 But where a creditor by virtue of pro-
ceedings under the Revised Statutes for the sale of the
property of absent and absconding debtors in order to col-
lect the debt, purchases his debtor's land at such a sale,
he is a purchaser for a valuable consideration within the
recording act, although the entire purchase price, except so
much as is required to satisfy the expenses of the proceed-
ings is applied in payment of the debt.26 The legal expenses
23 Van Heusen v. Radcliff, 17 N. Y. 580 (1858); Smith v. Felton, 43 N. Y.
419 (1871) ; Young -. Heermans, 66 N. Y. 374 (1876).
' Gibson v. Warden, 14 Wall. 244 (U. S. 1871) ; In re Steiner's Improved
Dye Works, Inc., 44 F. (2d) 557 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930).
1Devoe v. Brant, 53 N. Y. 462, 466 (1873); Naugatuck Cutlery Co. v.
Babcock, 22 Hun 481 (N. Y. 1880).
"'Wood v. Chapin, 13 N. Y. 509 (1856). But contra, see Thompson v.
Rose, 16 Conn. 71 (1844); Thaxter v. Foster, 153 Mass. 151, 26 N. E. 434
(1891).
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necessarily incurred, which have to be advanced by the party
promoting the proceedings, are something in addition to the
existing debt, which the purchaser had parted with as a
consideration for the conveyance which he receives.
A purchaser from one who is protected by the record-
ing act against a prior unrecorded conveyance is himself
entitled to such protection, notwithstanding he purchased
with notice of the prior conveyance, or without parting with
a valuable consideration.17
As examples of what clearly amount to valuable con-
sideration Pomeroy gives the following: a contemporaneous
advance or loan of money, or a sale, transfer, or exchange
of property, made at the time of the purchase.2
Consideration Must be Paid Before Notice. Not only
must there be a valuable consideration in fact, but it must
be paid before notice of the prior claim. Notice after the
agreement for the purchase is made, but before any pay-
ment, will destroy the character of a bona fide purchaser.20
Where a part only of the price or consideration has been
paid before notice, either the defendant should be entitled
to the position and protection of a bona fide purchaser pro
tanto,30 or the plaintiff should be permitted to enforce his
claim to the property only upon condition of his doing equity
by refunding to the defendant the amount already paid
before receiving the notice.31
The Amount of Consideration is Generally Not Material.
If property of an actual value is paid, the amount is not
material if the transaction is otherwise in good faith.32 The
amount if grossly small and inadequate would not be a valu-
able consideration so as to protect the purchaser because it
'Wood v. Chapin, supra note 26; Webster v. Van Steenbergh, supra
note 19.
12 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed.) §747, citing Gerson v.
Pool, 31 Ark. 85 (1876) (loaning money on the security of a trust deed);
Bowen v. Prout, 52 Ill. 354 (1869) (exchange of land).
-9Jewett v. Palmer, 7 Johns. Ch. 65 (N. Y. 1823); Penfield v. Dunbar,
supra note 19.0 Sargent v. Eureka Spund Apparatus Co., 46 Hun 19, 11 N. Y. St. Rep.
68 (1887) ; Pickett v. Barron, supra note 19; Frost v. Beekman, spra note 21;
Farmers Loan Co. v. Maltby, 8 Paige 361 (N. Y. 1840); dictum in Ten Eyck v.
Witbeck, supra note 16.
Macauley v. Smith, 132 N. Y. 524, 30 N. E. 997 (1892).
2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed.) §747.
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would show bad faith.33 The consideration must not only
be good, but valuable in the sense that a fair equivalent is
given for the property granted in order to constitute the
grantee a purchaser for value.
Surrender Or Relinquishment of an Existing Legal
Right, except extinguishment of a past debt, is a valuable
consideration 34 as for example, parting with the equitable
title to land 35 or giving the overdue note of a third person 36
or the surrender to a party of his own past due promissory
note 37 in return for goods delivered.
' See Ten Eyck v. Witbeck, supra note 16, where a father conveyed to a
daughter a farm worth $20,000 in consideration of $10, which was paid, and of
her undertaking to pay the net proceeds of the place to him during his life, and
after his death a certain portion thereof to his wife and other daughter. Held,
that the deed did not render her a purchaser for valuable consideration under
the recording act as against a prior unrecorded conveyance by the father. The
undertakings in the deed were not a valuable consideration since they had no
binding force apart from the deed; and in a transaction which was in all essen-
tials a gift, "a small sum, inserted-and paid, perhaps because of a popular belief
that some slight money consideration is necessary to render the deed valid, will
not, of itself, satisfy the terms of the statute, where it appears upon the face of
the conveyance or by other competent evidence that it was not the actual
consideration."
2 POMEROY, Equ TY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed.) §747.
In Westbrook v. Gleason, 79 N. Y. 23 (1879), a vendee under a land
contract was in open possession, having made improvements. While he was
thus in possession, a mortgage was given upon the land by his vendor, which
was unrecorded. Afterwards, and before this mortgage was recorded, he took
a deed of conveyance of the land from his vendor and gave back a bond and
mortgage to secure the whole price. This deed he put on record before the
first-named mortgage was recorded. The only question was, whether he could
claim the benefit of his earliest record, by being a purchaser for a valuable
consideration, although he had not paid any of the price. The Court said:
"* * * that if by accepting the deed he parted with his equitable title to the
land, which had precedence of the plaintiff's mortgage [and thereby lost the
priority], and with his right to the improvements, etc., then he was, within all
the cases, a purchaser for value."
' Essex County Bank v. Russell, 29 N. Y. 673 (1864), where a bank,
which by way of discounting a note, gave an overdue note of a third person in
no way connected with the note discounted, and the balance in cash, was held
to be a holder for value of the note thus discounted. Davies, J., said: "The
Brewster note was, though overdue, good and valuable paper. It was worth its
nominal amount, and was collectible for two years afterwards. It was a chose-
in-action which the plaintiffs had a right to sell and transfer to Comst9ck. To
the full extent of its value, it was a valuable consideration. The circumstance
of its being overdue did not detract from this value. It was not a precedent
debt, in the sense of a commercial paper. It was not a debt against any of
the parties to the present paper, nor, so far as appears, against Comstock him-
self. * * * It was parted with absolutely and left no remedy in the hands of the
bank against any of the parties to the Brewster note. All this was, I think,
parting with value, within the meaning of the cases on the subject."
IPaddon v. Taylor, 44 N. Y. 371 (1871), where a holder of a past due
promissory note of the fraudulent vendee delivered it up to him in return for a
warehouse receipt for the fraudulently purchased goods, it was held that he
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Assumption of a New Legal Obligation is Not Value as
Long as the Obligation is Revocable Or Rescindable.38 At
common law, not value promised but value actually ren-
dered is required.3 9  Where the purchaser who has not as
yet paid but merely given his executory promise to pay, is
required to surrender to the original defrauded seller the
goods he has acquired from the fraudulent buyer, he can
generally be at least substantially compensated for the loss
of the goods by the cancellation of his obligation to pay for
them-for upon failure of the consideration he can be re-
lieved from such obligations in equity even-if not at law.
Where his obligation was not of an irrevocable nature or
has not become irrevocable, practical justice is accom-
plished by returning the goods to the defrauded owner, leav-
ing the purchaser from the fraudulent vendee, his remedy
of rescinding or revoking the obligation he had assumed.40
Practical considerations have prevented the decision of this
question by the mere syllogistic application of the test of
consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. 41 It
follows, therefore, that his own executory promise, contract,
bond, covenant, bond and mortgage, or other non-negotiable
security for the price, will not render the party a bona fide
became thereby a bona fide purchaser of the goods represented by the receipt.
The Court said: "The facts in regard to the consideration paid by the defen-
dant are, that he held the promissory note of the alleged fraudulent purchaser,
given to him for money loaned, equal in amount to the value of the flour. He
purchased the flour and gave up the note in payment of the price. This pay-
ment made the purchase by the defendant valid against the plaintiff so far as
the consideration bears upon the bona fide character of the transaction."
A portion of the definition of value given in §76 of the Uniform Sales
Act is that value is "any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract."
But as that was not in accord with the common law conception of value in this
state (see note 39, infra), our legislature, in adopting the Sales Act, omitted
that definition.
' In Weaver v. Barden, supra note 19, after an exhaustive review of the
authorities, Allen, I., said: "Something more than a good consideration, a con-
sideration which would be sfflicient as between the parties to the transaction,
was necessary to shield him against the claim of the plaintiff." (Italics mine.)
'0 Williston says: "Upon principle there seems no good reason why a pur-
chaser should be deprived of the benefit of his bargain because his obligation to
pay is executory. The original owner or claimant of the goods should not have
the right to deprive the innocent purchaser of the goods, but should be obliged
to get relief from the enforcement for his advantage, of the obligation, of the
purchaser to pay the price. This doctrine is perhaps opposed to the general
legal understanding, but is not unsupported by authority." WILTISTON, SALES
§620.
1 VoLD, ON SALES (1931) 382.
VALUE
purchaser, nor entitle him to protection,42 and it has so been
held under the common law decisions of this state.43 Gen-
erally the doctrine of bona fide purchase applies to the situ-
ation where one has bought for value and without notice
from another who had falsely represented by silence or
otherwise that he had a good title to convey. In such cases
the bona fide purchaser's promise to pay for the goods is not
binding on him since he can revoke or rescind it for the
fraud, and hence he has not parted with value in the sense
that he has irretrievably lost something if the goods are
taken from him and restored to the original defrauded
owner.
Assumption of a Yew Legal Obligation Which is in its
Nature Irrevocable, clearly amounts to a valuable consid-
eration. Payment of actual cash is not indispensable. The
assumption of an irrevocable obligation, from which the
purchaser could not be relieved even by a failure of the con-
sideration arising from the title being invalid may be suffi-
cient.44  There are many forms of such obligation: One
of these occurs where the purchaser has given his own nego-
tiable notes for the whole or part of the price. In some
jurisdictions it is held that as long as the negotiable instru-
ment remains unnegotiated in the hands of the fraudulent
vendee, the purchaser is not a bona fide purchaser for
value ;45 but where the negotiable instrument has been actu-
2 PomEaoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed.) §747.
"Moore v. Ryder, 65 N. Y. 438 (1875), per Earl, C., "I am also of the
opinion that the mere promise of the transferee of such paper does not make
him a holder for value for the reason that the promise is not binding, and
cannot, therefore, in a legal sense, subject him to loss. The promise is no more
binding than it would have been if it had been made to pay a certain sum of
money at some future time to the fraudulent negotiator of the paper. That
such a promise made the transferee a holder for value within the meaning of
the rule, no one would claim." Partridge v. Rubin, 15 Daly 344, 6 N. Y. Supp.
657 (1889), where it was held that one who purchased on credit goods which
had been fraudulently obtained, and paid nothing on account, was not a pur-
chaser for value, and the original vendor could recover them from him, even
thoufgh he had no knowledge of the fraud. The Court said: "It is preposterous
to argue that the charge made against her in the books of Epstein is the giving
of a thing of value by the defendant. * * * The purchase money must be
actually paid in order to make the purchaser, a purchaser for value." See, also,
Spicer v. Waters, 65 Barb. 227 (N. Y. 1866); Harris v. Norton, 16 Barb. 264
(N. Y. 1853) ; Ells v. Tousley, 1 Paige 280 (N. Y. 1828) ; De Mott v. Starkey,
3 Barb. Ch. 403 (N. Y. 1848).
2 POMERoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed.) §747.
" See Rush v. Mitchell, 71 Iowa 333, 32 N. W. 367 (1887).
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ally negotiated, so as to render him liable thereon to a holder
in due course before receiving notice of a prior lien, he is
treated as a bona fide purchaser for value and entitled to
protection as such.46  But in New York State, at common
law, the fact that the purchaser has given his own checks
or promissory notes will not make him a bona fide purchaser
for value while they are still unpaid 47 even though they
may have been negotiated to a holder in due course.48  An-
other form would be the undertaking by the purchaser to
pay a debt due from the vendor to a third person in such a
manner that he was absolutely substituted as the debtor in
the place of his vendor.49
" Donalson v. Thomason, 137 Ga. 848, 74 S. E. 762 (1912).
"
7 Jewett v. Palmer, supra note 29, where at the time of the delivery of a
deed the defendant paid part of the consideration therefor by the transfer of
promissory notes, but the cash balance was not paid until after notice of the
fraud. It was held that he was not a bona fide purchaser. Chancellor Kent
said: "A plea of a purchase for a valuable consideration, without notice, must
be with the money actually paid; or else, according to Lord Hardwicke, you are
not hurt. The averment must be, not only that the purchaser had no notice, at
or before the time of the execution of the deeds, but that the purchase money
was paid before notice. There must not only be a denial of notice before the
purchase, but a denial of notice before payment of the money. Even if the
purchase money be secured to be paid, yet if it be not in fact paid, before
notice, the pleas of a purchase for a valuable consideration will be overruled."
rn Freeman v. Deming, 3 Sand. Ch. 327 (N. Y. 1846), it was held that the
giving of negotiable promissory notes for the price is not of itself such a
payment as will constitute one a bona fide purchaser in equity.
In Crandall v. Vickery, 45 Barb. 156 (N. Y. 1865), the plaintiff gave his
checks for the amount of some notes, but before the checks had been presented
or exchanged and before any of them were paid, he learned of the fraud. It
was held he was not a bona fide holdei for value of the notes.
" In Barnard v. Campbell, supra note 6, one Jeffries contracted to sell
defendant's 1,800 bags of linseed which he did not then own, or had even con-
tracted to buy. On the same day defendants mailed to him their notes for the
amount of the purchase price. Subsequently Jeffries fraudulently obtained pos-
session of the linseed from the plaintiffs and shipped it to defendants. It was
held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the linseed from the defendants
as the latter were not bona fide purchasers for value even though it appeared
that Jeffries had pledged their notes as collateral for a loan before they had
notice of the fraud. The Court said the defendants had parted with no value.
It should be observed, however, that the notes were not given at the time the
goods were received, but some days before, perhaps so that Jeffries could at
once negotiate them for a loan. If that was the purpose, then it might be said
that Jeffries was indebted to the defendants by way of a loan by them of their
credit to him prior to the time the linseed was delivered, in which case the
defendants may be said to have taken the linseed in payment of an antecedent
debt. But even if we adopt this view it would not constitute the defendant's
bona fide purchasers for value.
" In Jackson v. Winslow, 9 Cow. 13 (N. Y. 1828), it was held that a
grantee, assuming the payment of a debt due from his grantor, is a sufficient
consideration to make a purchase or mortgage of land valid within the registry
acts as against an unrecorded deed.
VALUE
Taking Property in Payment or Discharge of an Antece-
dent Debt. If the question were to be answered merely from
the standpoint of whether there were sufficient consideration
to support a contract, it would seem that a creditor who takes
goods in satisfaction of an antecedent debt is a purchaser
for value. But as has been said, a valuable consideration
in such cases means something more than the discharge of
a debt that revives when the consideration for its discharge
fails. It means the parting with some value that cannot be
actually restored, by operation of law, leaving the purchaser
in a changed condition so that he may lose something besides
his bargain.50 Accordingly, even in jurisdictions holding at
common law that one taking negotiable instruments in sat-
isfaction of a pre-existing debt was a holder for value, the
courts refused to so hold in reference to such purchasers
of chattels,5 1 on the ground that the law that compels the
restoration of the goods to the original defrauded seller,
can also by the same process reinstate the original debt.52
Although the parties may thus be restored to their original
positions as far as legal liabilities are concerned, the inno-
cent purchaser frequently cannot be put back to his orig-
inal position so far as its business aspects are concerned,
for the debt may have been collectible and have been col-
In Williams v. Shelly, 37 N. Y. 375 (1867, M and D agreed for the pur-
chase of a large amount of goods; some of the sellers refused to deliver the
goods without security; the plaintiff became the surety of M and D for the
price of the goods, which were thereupon delivered to M and D. M and D later
transferred to the plaintiff all their interest in the goods for which the plaintiff
had become surety, and plaintiff agreed to pay for said goods and to indemnify
M and D against their liability therefor. Plaintiff took possession of the goods.
Later defendant, a sheriff acting on behalf of one of the creditors of M and D,
seized the goods under an execution against M and D. Held, plaintiff was a
bona fide purchaser for value. The plaintiff thus assumed a new liability; he
became the principal debtor instead of a surety for others.
'Hurd v. Bickford, 85 Me. 217, 27 Atl. 107 (1892).
24 RULING CAsE LAW 384.
Sleeper v. Davis, 64 N. H. 59, 6 Atl. 201 (1886) ; Eaton v. Davidson, 46
Ohio St. 355, 21 N. E. 442 (1889) "If the consideration of the purchase from
the fraudulent vendee is the release of a pre-existing debt, the purchaser will be
restored to what he may have yielded up, if the original owner who has been
defrauded reclaims and recovers the property. The consideration having failed,
it will be adequate to furnish him the needed relief, even though, as in the
present case, there may have been a surrender of a promissory note. The pur-
chaser will not, therefore, be materially affected in his legal rights, by the
retaking of the goods by the original owner."
Hurd v. Bickford, mtpra note 50: "While the discharge of a pre-existing
debt is in one sense a valuable consideration, yet, if the title of the vendee fails,
the discharge of the debt fails also, and he has lost nothing by the transaction."
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lected had it not been settled for by the transfer of the goods.
When that transfer is later rescinded by operation of law
and the goods restored to the original defrauded party, the
fraudulent buyer may have become insolvent, or have con-
cealed his assets. In such a case the loss is thrown from
the original innocent victim of the fraud to another equally
innocent party, who has an equal stake in the outcome.
Moreover, the general social effect of the rule that antece-
dent debt is not value, is evil since it impairs the security
of transactions." For these reasons in some states 1; and
in the Federal Courts 55 it is held, even in the absence of a
statute, that where goods are transferred by a fraudulent
buyer in satisfaction of a pre-existing debt, the innocent
transferee is protected against their being reclaimed by the
original defrauded seller.
In New York State at common law it has been repeat-
edly held that one who takes chattels, land or mortgage in
payment or discharge of a pre-existing debt, is not a pur-
chaser for value unless, at the same time, and as part of
the same transaction he gives some new consideration, such
as surrendering some security or evidence of indebtedness,
or in some other manner changes his legal status to his
detriment.5 6  Merely extending credit upon a pre-existing
debt is not sufficient.5 7
'VOLD, ON SALES (1931) 382, 383.
" Pelham v. Chattahoochee Grocery Co., 146 Ala. 216, 41 So. 12 (1906);
Butters v. Haughwout, 42 Ill. 18, 89 Am. Dec. 401 (1886) ; City Bank v. Easton
Boot & Shoe Co., 187 Pa. 30, 40 Atl. 1026 (1898).
Pere Marquette Ry. Co. v. French & Co., 254 U. S. 538, 41 Sup. Ct. 195
(1920) ; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters 1 (U. S. 1842) ; Brooklyn City & N. R. R.
Co. v. Nat. Bank of Republic, 102 U. S. 14 (1880).
Padgett v. Lawrence, 10 Paige 170 (N. Y. 1843) (purchase of real prop-
erty merely upon the consideration of a prior indebtedness of the grantor);
Root v. French, 13 Wend. 570 (N. Y. 1835) (transfer of goods in payment of
a pre-existing debt) ; Cary v. White, 52 N. Y. 141 (1873) (mortgage received
in payment of a precedent debt); Stevens v. Brennan, 79 N. Y. 258 (1879)
(goods taken in payment of a precedent debt); Duffus v. Furnace Co., 15
Misc. 169, 37 N. Y. Supp. 19 (1896), rev'd on other grounds in 8 App. Div. 567,
40 N. Y. Supp. 925 (4th Dept. 1896) (mortgage given for a pre-existing debt) ;
Gowing v. Warner, 29 Misc. 593, 61 N. Y. Supp. 500 (1899), aff'd, 30 Misc.
593, 62 N. Y. Supp. 797 (1900) (transfer of goods for a precedent debt).
" Weaver v. Barden, supra note 19 (receipt of shares of stock merely cred-
iting prior indebtedness therewith. Per Allen, J.: "It is generally admitted
that the mere existence of a precedent debt is not sufficient consideration to
support a conveyance as against prior equities; but in some states it is held that
when made in absolute payment and satisfaction of an antecedent debt, the
purchse will be regarded as a purchase for value. But that is not the rule in
VALUE
The same rule applied in New York State to one who
took negotiable instruments in payment or discharge of an
antecedent debt.,8 But, by section 51 of the Negotiable In-
struments Law, enacted in 1897, an antecedent or pre-
existing debt constitutes value.5 9
Taking Property as Security for Antecedent Debt. A
conveyance of real or personal property as security for an
antecedent debt does not, upon principle, render the trans-
feree a bona fide purchaser, since the creditor parts with no
value, surrenders no right, and places himself in no worse
legal position than before.6 0  Where goods are taken by a
creditor as security for a pre-existing debt merely on the
debtor's hope of receiving indulgence thereby, without giv-
ing any binding extension of time, the weight of common
law authority in this country regarded the transfer as not
a transfer for value.0 1 It is well settled at common law
in New York that the mere taking of property real or per-
sonal as security for a pre-existing debt, without surrender-
ing up or cancelling some written security or without any
additional agreement is not a valuable consideration. 2
this state"); Button v. Rathbone, Sard & Co., 126 N. Y. 187, 27 N. E. 266
(1891) (chattel mortgage taken for antecedent debt); Cowles v. Kiehel, 65
N. Y. Supp. 349 (1899) (taking shares of stock, merely crediting pre-existent
debt).
'Coddington v. Bay, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y. 1819), aff'd, 20 Johns. 637
(N. Y. 1822).
' The authoritative effect of Coddington v. Bay, ibid., was not definitely
overruled until Kelso & Co. v. Ellis, 224 N. Y. 528, 121 N. E. 364 (1918).
. 2 POMEROY, EqUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed.) §749.
'VOLD, ON SALES (1931) 383 and cases there cited.
'Wood v. Robinson, 22 N. Y. 564 (1860) (mortgage taken to secure a
precedent debt. Per Denio, J.: "But the mortgage was taken as collateral
security for an antecedent debt, nothing being advanced at the time, and no
security given up. It is not found that there was any definite contract for
extending the credit on the demands which the bank held against Mann; but
for anything which appears, these demands might have been prosecuted imme-
diately, notwithstanding the execution of the mortgage. Where a conveyance
is made, or a security taken, the consideration of which was an antecedent debt,
the grantee or party taking the security is not looked upon as a bona fide pur-
chaser") ; Taft v. Chapman, 50 N. Y. 445 (1872), holding that one who takes
stolen bonds as a margin on the purchase price of stock purchased by him for
the thief is not a bona fide holder for value, even though he subsequently ful-
filled the contract for the purchase of the stock by paying therefor; in making
such payments, they (the defendants) simply performed their contract with their
vendors; the obligation to make this payment existed before the bonds were
received, and was not in any way induced or affected thereby; Cary v. White,
52 N. Y. 141 (1873) (mortgage taken as security for an existing debt);
De Lancey v. Stearns, 66 N. Y. 162 (1876) (mortgage of land as security for
an existing debt is not sufficient to bring the mortgage within the protection of
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The same rule applied in New York to the transfer of
negotiable instruments.6 3 In this respect the rule in this
state was different from that in the United States Supreme
Court and the majority of states. 64 But by section 51 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law, enacted in 1897, antece-
dent or pre-existing debt constitutes value. However, some
of our courts continued to hold section 51 merely declara-
tory of the common law rule and that a creditor receiving
a negotiable instrument as security only, did not give
value.65 It was not until 1918, over twenty years after the
passage of the Negotiable Instruments Law, that our Court
of Appeals overruled Ooddington v. Bay and held that tak-
ing negotiable instruments as security for an antecedent
debt constitutes value.66
However, at common law in this state, if, in addition
to taking property as collateral security for a pre-existing
debt, the creditor at the same time agreed either to forbear
suing on or to extend the time of payment of the original
debt 17 or at the same time and as part of the agreement
surrendered up or cancelled the written evidence of such
the Recording Act) ; Stevens. v. Brennan, 79 N. Y. 258 (1879) (goods taken
as security for a precedent debt) ; Young v. Guy, 87 N. Y. 457 (1882), holding
that one who takes a mortgage on real estate as security for past due promissory
notes of the mortgagor is not a mortgagee for value within the protection of
the Recording Act.
' Supra note 58.
Brooklyn City, etc., R. Co. v. Nat. Bank, 102 U. S. 14 (1880).
'Sutherland v. Mead, 80 App. Div. 103, 80 N. Y. Supp. 504 (1st Dept.
1903); Roseman v. Mahony, 86 App. Div. 377, 83 N. Y. Supp. 749 (2d Dept.
1903); Framingham Trust Co. v. Villard, 74 Misc. 204, 133 N. Y. Supp. 823
(1911).
'Kelso Co. v. Ellis, sufpra note 59.
07 O'Brien v. Fleckenstein, 180 N. Y. 350, 73 N. E. 30 (1905), holding that
one who takes a mortgage as security for a precedent'debt, and gives a valid
extension of the time of payment of that debt, is a bona fide purchaser within
the meaning of the Recording Act; Berner v. Kaye, 14 Misc. 1, 35 N. Y. Supp.
181 (1895), motion for reargument or for leave to appeal to the Court of
Appeals denied in 35 N. Y. Supp. 1103 (1895), holding that one who takes a
mortgage and in return agrees not to sue on the mortgagor's overdue note, is a
mortgagee for value as against the vendor in an unfiled conditional sale, though
such forbearance was not to endure for any fixed time, forbearance for a rea-
sonable time being implied under the circumstances of the case.
In Durkee v. Nat. Bank, 36 Hun 565 (N. Y. 1885), a bank took a mortgage
as security for a mortgagor's notes discounted by the bank, and agreed to
refrain from suing him on such notes for a certain time. It was held that the
bank was a holder for value of the mortgage so as to entitle it, as against a
prior unrecorded mortgage, to the benefit of the statute.
VALUE
antecedent 68 he was regarded as a bona fide purchaser for
value.
But such forbearance or extension of time must have
been expressly bargained for and agreed upon, for the mere
taking of collateral security on time is not per se, and in
the absence of any agreement beyond it, an extension of
time for the payment of the original debtY9 But, as Pro-
fessor Vold very well points out, even though forbearance
is not expressly bargained for, the effect of conveying goods
as security is almost inevitably to cause the creditor to for-
bear or to relax his efforts to make present collection, there-
by in fact producing the result that this line of credit is
maintained a while longer on the strength of the new se-
curity when without the new security it would have been
closed out.70
Where a purchaser of chattels pays partly in cash and
partly by the extinguishment of a pre-existing debt, the
weight of authority seems to hold that he is a purchaser for
value.71 However small may be the additional considera-
tion paid by the creditor, besides discharging an antecedent
debt, it will serve to constitute him a bona fide purchaser
for value in the absence of fraudulent knowledge on his
part 7 2 But it has been held that a sale and delivery of
12 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §747: "If one taking goods frau-
dulently purchased as security for a pre-existing debt, at the time releases
sdcurity which he held for the debt, such as a surety or collateral security, this
will place him in the position of a purchaser for value."
Cary v- White, supra note 62, disapproving of dictum to the contrary in
Pratt v. Coman, 37 N. Y. 440 (1868). In Cary v. White, the Court said: "We
are cited to several cases in which judges have said, in substance, that the taking
of a collateral security on time is an extension of the time of payment of the
principal debt; that is, that the right of action for the original debt or upon the
original security is suspended until the collateral security shall become due. It
is so said in Pratt v. Coman, and in the cases cited by the learned judge in that
case. But the remark was not necessary to the decision, and is not supported by
authority. In those cases in which the time for the payment of the original
debt has been held to have been extended upon the receipt of a collateral secur-
ity, there was an express agreement to that effect" (citing cases).
"'VoLD, ON SAsES (1931) 383.
7Moyer v. McIntyre, 43 Hun 58 (N. Y. 1887), holding that where a pur-
chaser of a wagon from a conditional vendee paid for the same with ten dollars
in cash and applied fifty-five dollars of the balance of the price upon an old
debt owing him by the conditional vendee, without notice of the unfiled condi-
tional sale, he was a bona fide purchaser for value. Note (1926) 44 A. L. R.
488n, 493.
'Kingsbury v. Smith, 13 N. H. 109 (1842); Wear-Boogher Dry Goods
Co. v. Crews, 23 Tex. Civ. Appeals 667, 5 S. W. 73 (1900).
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goods in consideration of an antecedent indebtedness
amounting to $1600, and a cash consideration of $50 given
as a legal guard, is not sufficient to constitute the sub-
purchaser a purchaser for value.7 3
Summary. Except in the case of transfers of nego-
tiable instruments, negotiable warehouse receipts and cer-
tificates of stock,74 there is at present no statutory defini-
tion of value in New York State as applied to the doctrine
of bona fide purchase. None of the Recording Acts con-
tain such a definition of value.75  Therefore, in the situa-
tions contemplated under the Recording Acts, and under
Personal Property Law, sections 67, 101 (4), 105, 106, 119,
" Victoria Paper Mills Co. v. N. Y. & P. Co., 27 Misc. 179, 57 N. Y. Supp.
397 (1899), aff'd, 28 Misc. 123, 58 N. Y. Supp. 1070 (1899). The fact that the
small sum of money was paid on the advice of lawyers, that there might be no
question as to the validity of the sale, was insufficient to make the second pur-
chaser a bona fide purchaser for value.
"' Supra note 3.
LmN LAW §§230 and 235, relating to the filing and refiling of chattel
mortgages, declares a failure to do so where there is no immediate delivery and
change of possession of the mortgaged goods renders the mortgage void as to
subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith. But our Court of Appeals
has said in Button v. Rathbone, Sard & Co., 126 N. Y. 187, 27 N. E. 266 (1891),
that this statute is to be construed in analogy with the rule of conveyances of
real estate under the Recording Act, and in Van Heusen v. Radcliff, 17 N. Y.
580 (1858), that "when the act respecting the filing of chattel mortgages was
passed, the term bona fide purchaser had acquired a settled meaning which did
not include a person whose purchase was on account of an existing debt and
who parted with no property or right to obtain his conveyance." It has been
held that one who takes a chattel mortgage to secure an antecedent debt is not
a mortgagee in good faith within the meaning of LIEN LAW §230; Thompson
v. Van Vechten, 27 N. Y. 568 (1863); Doig v. Haverly, 92 Hun 176, 37 N. Y.
Supp. 455 (1895); Hof v. Mager, 168 App. Div. 318, 154 N. Y. Supp. 60
(2d Dept. 1915).
REAL PROPERTY LAW, art. 8 (§§240-275) relating to conveyances and mort-
gages, contains no definition of value, and art. 9 (§§290-334), relating to record-
ing instruments affecting real property, contains no definition of value. But it
has been held that the consideration which a grantee must have paid to entitle
him to protection against a prior unrecorded deed or incumbrance must be such
as the law denominates a valuable consideration. While it is not necessary that
the consideration should be adequate in point of value, a merely nominal amount
is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a valuable consideration. Ten
Eyck v. Witbeck, supra note 16; Dunn v. Dunn, 151 App. Div. 800, 136 N. Y.
Supp. 282 (3d Dept. 1912). In reference to §291 of the REAL PROPERTY LAW, the
Court of Appeals has said that the phrase a "purchaser in good faith and for a
valuable consideration" is not peculiar to the Recording Acts, but is one of
frequent occurrence in the statutes and is "an expression which has been bor-
rowed from the language of courts of equity, and should be interpreted in the
sense in which it is there understood." Ten Eyck v. Witbeck, .rpra.
PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW §32, requiring transfers and mortgages of inter-
ests in decedent's estates to be recorded does not define a valuable consideration.
STocK CORPORATION LAW §17, requiring filing of certificate of consent of
stockholders to a corporate mortgage, does not define value.
VALUE
143, 192, 193, 200, 201 (b), 209, 225, 226 (d) and 228; and
Real Property Law, sections 95, 245 and 266, the common
law conceptions of value as outlined in this article still
apply. 6
But under Personal Property Law, sec. 40, relating to
transfers of personal property fraudulent as to creditors,
it has been held that an antecedent indebtedness is value
sufficient to validate a transfer of property from a debtor
to his creditor.77 This is in line with the provisions of the
Debtor and Creditor Law relating to conveyances fraudu-
lent as to creditors.78 A distinction is made between trans-
fers and conveyances by an insolvent debtor to a creditor
fraudulent as to other creditors and transfers and convey-
ances made by one who is not insolvent. A conveyance or
mortgage by an insolvent debtor for a pre-existing debt
amounts merely to a preference and the rights of a debtor,
in the absence of any statute to the contrary to prefer any
creditor, though the effect be to leave other creditors with-
out means to collect their claims is clear. In the absence
of statutory restrictions an insolvent debtor has the right
to transfer all his property to one of his creditors in pay-
ment of or to secure his debts, when that is his honest pur-
pose, although the effect of the transfer is to place his prop-
erty beyond the reach of his other creditors and render their
debts uncollectible. In another case the distinction be-
tween conveyances to creditors and those to strangers was
drawn as follows: "When a transfer is made to a stranger,
to bring himself within the provisions of the statute as to
a purchaser, he must show that he has an equity which is
paramount to that of his vendor, and this can only be done
by showing he has parted with value, and is not chargeable
with notice of the fraud. But where the transfer is to a
creditor of the vendor a different principle prevails. It is
not necessary to show a new consideration, as the transac-
tion amounts to nothing more than the voluntary prefer-
ence of one creditor over another." 79
" For brief statement as to contents of said sections of the- REAL and PER-
SONAL PROPERTY LAWS, see note 2, supra.
I Frank v. von Bayer, 236 N. Y. 473, 141 N. E. 920 (1923).
"Lehrenkrauss v. Bonnell, 199 N. Y. 240, 92 N. E. 637 (1910), per
Cullen, J.
"Murphy v. Briggs, 89 N. Y. 446 (1882).
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Conclusion.
Judge Cullen has said: "What may be an insufficient
consideration to support a transaction of one character may
be sufficient to support another of a different character." 80
A person taking a promissory note merely as collateral for
an antecedent debt has all the rights of a bona fide holder,
yet a pre-existing debt does not constitute a bona fide holder
for value as against instruments conveying real or personal
property. One who takes a negotiable warehouse receipt
as security for an antecedent debt is a bona fide purchaser
for value, while one taking a negotiable bill of lading under
the same circumstances is not. Under section 40, Personal
Property Law, relating to transfers of Personal Property
fraudulent as to creditors, an antecedent "indebtedness is
value sufficient to validate a transfer against the trans-
feror's creditors, whereas one taking a conveyance in satis-
faction of a pre-existing debt is not protected under the
Recording Act against a prior unrecorded deed.
This confusion and contradiction in the conception of
value is due chiefly to the fact that our legislature in enact-
ing the five Uniform Acts dealing respectively with nego-
tiable instruments, warehouse receipts, stock certificates,
bills of lading and the sale of goods, adopted in the first
three the definition of value common to all of them but omit-
ted such definition in the last two.8' To some who have
written on this subject it seems desirable to have a single
rule for what constitutes valuable consideration 82 and that
mercantile convenience supports the one common to all five
Uniform Acts as drafted by the Commissioners of Uniform
State Laws.8 3 Therefore, it has been advocated that the
s' Supra note 78.
s Su pra notes 3 and 4.
' Williston says: "There seems Vo reason to distinguish what constitutes
value where negotiable paper is purchased and where property of other sorts
is purchased. The purchaser for value of negotiable paper may get greater
rights than the purchaser of property of other kinds, but it seems an unneces-
sary and undesirable complication of the law to maintain a distinction as to
what constitutes value. This is especially true so far as chattel property is con-
cerned, since such property is frequently transferred by means of bills of lading
or warehouse receipts. In view of the large degree of negotiability given such
documents it would be unfortunate to distinguish them from negotiable paper
in respect to the definition of value." WILLISTON, SALES §623.
'30 Amer. Bar Assn. Rep. 391 (1906).
VALUE
Legislature, in order to put an end to the present confusion
and contradiction should hmend sections 156 and 239 of the
Personal Property Law by expressly adopting the definitions
of value contained in the Uniform Sales Act, section 76, and
the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, section 53, respectively.
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That desired result may, however, be gradually brought
about by judicial decision and interpretation alone with-
out the aid of statute. 5 But even if this change in the con-
cept of value were accomplished with respect to the transfer
of personal property, it would leave the present common law
standard of value still in force as applied to transfers of
real property.
It seems to the writer that it is erroneous to suppose
that a single standard of value should be applied to all
transfers of property, irrespective of the nature of the prop-
erty. The basic question underlying the doctrine of bona
fide purchase is whether it is more socially advantageous
to protect the innocent purchaser than to restore the prop-
erty to the original defrauded seller. If the property trans-
ferred is of such a nature that social and business needs re-
quire that it possess a high degree of negotiability, the stand-
ard of value necessary to protect the innocent purchaser
should be correspondingly low. Hence it is that very little
in the way of value need be given by the innocent purchaser
of negotiable instruments in order to entitle him to the
status of a holder for value. Indeed, value is often pre-
sumed in such cases. With respect to negotiable warehouse
receipts and stock certificates, commercial necessities like-
wise require a high, though not perhaps as high, degree of
negotiability and so it is quite proper that the value pro-
ceeding from the innocent purchaser should also be corres-
pondingly low. The same should be true with respect to
the transfers of negotiable bills of lading.
' Creditors as Purchasers for Value i New York, appearing in the New
York Law Journal, Dec. 17, 1903, by Professor Walter B. Kennedy of Fordham
University School of Law.
"How far the rule in this state as to the meaning of 'value' has been
changed by the revision of the statutes in cases not affected by the federal rule
we do not now consider. If it survives, it has been subjected to many inroads,"
per Cardozo, J., in Baldwin v. Childs, 249 N. Y. 212, 216, 163 N. E. 737, 738
(1928).
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It is obvious that chattels, as such, do not, and need
not possess such a high, degree of negotiability as negotiable
instruments, negotiable warehouse receipts and negotiable
stock certificates. Therefore where the transfer of chattels
is effected without the use of negotiable documents of title,
it would seem that there is not the same commercial neces-
sity for protecting the innocent purchaser and hence the
standard of value required from him should be somewhat
higher in order to entitle him to keep the goods against the
original defrauded owner. From this economic point of
view the omission of our Legislature to adopt in the Sales
Act the same definition of value as found in the other Uni-
form Acts relating to negotiable instruments and negotiable
documents of title, seems defensible. But by the same eco-
nomic test the omission of the definition of value contained
in the Uniform Bills of Lading Act seems indefensible.
It is likewise obvious that economic needs do not re-
quire that real property, or interests in real property, pos-
sess as high a degree of negotiability and hence there is
less commercial necessity for protecting the innocent pur-
chaser and therefore it would seem proper to require a
higher standard of value from him in order to entitle him
to keep the property as against the original defrauded
owner.
It would therefore seem that the present common and
statutory law prevailing in New York State in reference
to the standard of value required under the doctrine of
bona fide purchase, differing as it does in respect to different
classes of property, is in the main both economically sound
and legally and equitably defensible.
FREDERICK A. WHITNEY.
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